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Abstract
We analyze an equilibrium search model in a duopoly setting with bilateral
heterogeneities in production and search costs in which firms can advertise
by announcing price and location. We study existence, stability, and com-
parative statics in such a setting, compare the market advertising level to
the socially optimal level, and find conditions in which firms advertise more
or less than the social optimum.
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1 Introduction
Imperfect price information is a fundamental aspect of any consumer search model.
Avenues that can improve this information, such as advertising, therefore have a
natural role as consumers can refine their knowledge of prices as they receive new
information. In this paper, we study an equilibrium search model in a duopoly
setting and introduce an advertising technology by which firms can inform con-
sumers of their price. Our underlying market structure is similar to that of Carlson
and McAfee (1983) and Be´nabou (1993) with bilateral heterogeneities in produc-
tion and search costs. The market consists of a continuum of consumers with
individual search costs distributed along the unit interval, similar to Rob (1985),
where all consumers enter the market with a free initial search and can choose
to visit the other firm at some cost.1 We ask, given that consumers engage in
optimal search, will firms tend to over- or under-advertise relative to a planner?
Our analysis provides good insight on the interaction between search and adver-
tising in a duopoly setting and enhances our understanding of the welfare effects
of advertising with search.
A priori, it is unclear whether the market advertising level generally exceeds
that of a planner or vice versa. Since production costs and search cost expendi-
tures are welfare losses, the planner advertises to save some cost of production or
decrease search intensity. But acting purely as a profit maximizer, the firm ad-
vertises only to attract an excessively high search cost consumer, i.e., an inactive
searcher. If we take as our measure of welfare the sum of consumer and producer
surplus as well as search, advertising, and production costs, and consider inelastic
demand so that the sum of consumer surplus and total revenue are fixed, then
welfare depends completely on advertising, production, and search costs. In this
1Our model is therefore a simplified version of Rob (1985), Be´nabou (1993), and Robert and
Stahl (1993). We assume a free first search so as to avoid keeping track of those consumers who
elect not to buy. See Janssen, Moraga-Gonza´lez, and Wildenbeest (2005) for a relaxation of this
assumption.
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case, the planner sends buyers to the low price firm only if the decrease in search
or production costs exceeds the cost of advertising, a tradeoff which the firm does
not consider.
Note that our goal is not to establish equilibrium price dispersion under mini-
mal conditions as in Reinganum (1979), Burdett and Judd (1983), Rob (1985), and
Robert and Stahl (1993), among others. Indeed, with bilateral heterogeneities,
price dispersion is more or less an automatic byproduct of the assumed market
structure. Our goal in this paper is to develop an equilibrium search model that
highlights the fundamental role of price advertising and, in doing so, provide
definitive welfare results.
Given our duopoly setting, the model is fairly general. We allow for a relatively
general search cost distribution, potentially downward-sloping demand, and an
advertising function that can accommodate economies of scale. Under fairly mild
assumptions, we prove existence in pure strategies and derive comparative statics
with respect to production and advertising costs. Although these results can
go either way, we show that the relevant dynamic stability conditions rule out
counter-intuitive comparative statics.
We then turn to welfare issues, the main focus of the paper. The welfare
standard we adopt is that of a social planner maximizing welfare, as previously
discussed, subject to the first order conditions for price. We impose the latter
constraint because the first best solution of a planner allowed to choose both prices
and advertising intensity would be to essentially set the low cost firm’s price to
zero, making a useful comparison between the market and planner’s advertising
level impossible. The pricing constraint essentially forms a structural second best
problem so that the planner and firm are on the same footing with respect to their
advertising decisions.
Our analysis provides intuitive sufficient conditions such that market advertis-
ing intensity is above or below that of a planner. In general, firms over-advertise
when the indifferent consumer’s search cost is sufficiently low and under-advertise
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when this search cost is sufficiently high relative to the cost of production. For
symmetric search cost distributions, this implies that firms over-advertise when
the majority of consumers do not search. We express this result in terms of
production and advertising costs, the consumer’s maximum willingness to pay,
and advertising effectiveness—all of which relate to the tradeoff between advertis-
ing and search as a means to disseminate information to consumers. Intuitively,
under-advertising results for two reasons. One, the firm only cares about attract-
ing inactive searchers. Since this portion of the market decreases as the indifferent
consumer’s search cost increases, the firm has less incentive to advertise. Two, the
planner’s advertising decision is based partly on saving search costs. Since this sav-
ings increases with the indifferent consumer’s search cost, the planner advertises
more intensely. Similar intuition holds for over-advertising when the indifferent
consumer’s search cost is low. Since inactive searchers make up a relatively large
portion of the market, the firm has more incentive to advertise. In addition, the
search costs paid by consumers are generally lower, which decreases the planner’s
advertising incentive. The planner also understands that an increase in adver-
tising converts some marginal consumers from active searchers—where they pay
their search cost—to inactive searchers—where they may buy from the high cost
firm. This implicit cost of sending a few small search cost consumers to the high
cost firm further dulls the planner’s advertising incentive.
Previous advertising and sequential search models include Butters (1977),
Stegeman (1991), Robert and Stahl (1993), and Janssen and Non (2005). Robert
and Stahl show that, without ex ante heterogeneities, there exists a unique equi-
librium with price dispersion and derive comparative statics with regard to entry,
search costs, and advertising costs. While their analysis thoroughly describes the
strategic interaction of advertising and search in a general setting, they do not
compare the competitive and socially optimal advertising levels. Janssen and Non
develop a similar model for the special case of a duopoly and allow some small
percentage of completely informed consumers, i.e., shoppers. They derive partly
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contrasting results with Robert and Stahl and show that the inclusion of informed
consumers has important implications for comparative statics—especially the lim-
iting cases of zero search or advertising costs. But they also do not address the
planner’s advertising decision.
Although Butters’ (1977) model with search does compare the competitive
and socially optimal advertising levels, the advertising technology is such that
any given advertisement reaches exactly one consumer, which excludes economies
of scale. Buyers also do not adopt an optimal search process due to “certain
unpalatable conclusions” and instead visit any given firm with some probability
proportional to the firm’s sales. As such, these welfare results are only based
on optimal firm behavior. Finally, Butters does not impose the monopolistically
competitive pricing constraint on the social planner’s problem, making advertising
comparisons problematic. He nonetheless finds that firms always over-advertise.
Stegeman (1991) develops a similar model but allows for heterogeneous reservation
prices. He derives equivalent results only if search costs are sufficiently small but
generally finds that monopolistically competitive firms advertise too little.
Even without search, welfare results are not obvious. Dixit and Norman (1978)
show that advertising is excessive, while Shapiro (1980) extends this work, showing
that advertising is sometimes under-utilized.2 Shapiro, however, only considers
the monopoly case, and as Bagwell (2001) shows, Shapiro’s model can be extended
to several firms, which results in excessive advertising.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop the
model, prove existence and stability of equilibria, and derive comparative statics.
Section 3 establishes the major welfare results and characterizes conditions in
which the advertising firm over- or under-advertises. Proofs of all Propositions
are deferred to the Appendix.
2Butters (1976) and Bagwell (2001) provide good surveys of generally accepted results of the
literature and of the ambiguous nature of advertising and its effect on equilibrium outcomes.
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2 The Model
2.1 Model Setup
Consider a search model where consumers are identical except for their search
costs. The market is normalized to one, and buyers are identified by their search
cost s ∈ [0, 1]. The distribution of search costs follows a cdf Q(s), with pdf q(s)
and full support on [0, 1]. We assume that Q(0) = 0, q(s) is twice continuously dif-
ferentiable, and that q(s), q′(s), and q′′(s) are bounded with qmax = maxs∈[0,1] q(s),
qmin = mins∈[0,1] q(s), and similarly for q
′(s) and q′′(s). We also make the stan-
dard assumption that consumers are perfectly informed as to the distribution of
prices but are uncertain about which firms offer which price, as in Carlson and
McAfee (1983) and Be´nabou (1993). Given prices, individual demand arises from
a quasi-linear utility function, with indirect utility v(p) + y. By Roy’s Identity,
each consumer purchases d(p) = −v′(p) units at price p. Let pmax denote the
consumer’s maximum willingness to pay, and assume d(p) is twice continuously
differentiable with d′ < 0 on [0, pmax). Buyers enter the market with a free initial
search but must pay their search cost to visit another firm.
In a duopoly without advertising, half of the consumers randomly visit the
high cost firm and half visit the low. Of the unlucky buyers reaching the high
cost firm, only those consumers with sufficiently low search costs benefit from an
additional search. The decision of such a consumer is based on
v(pL)− s ≥ v(pH). (2.1)
This yields the critical search value sˆ = v(pL) − v(pH), which is the cost below
which consumers search again to find the low cost firm and above which consumers
purchase from whichever firm they randomly choose, i.e., for s ≥ sˆ, consumers are
inactive searchers. We refer to the buyer with s = sˆ as the indifferent consumer.
There are two firms, each producing identical goods with heterogenous costs
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of production. The low cost firm has marginal cost normalized to zero, while the
high cost firm has constant marginal and average costs of c > 0. Both firms can
advertise their price and location to a fraction of the market at some constant
marginal cost A > 0. Note that, since the distribution of prices is known, any
consumer receiving an advertisement is then perfectly informed of prices, in which
case the high price firm never advertises. We denote the level of advertising by
x ∈ [0, 1], where the advertising firm is bound to charge the price advertised, e.g.,
for legal reasons. Given x, denote the proportion of uninformed consumers by
f(x), where f(x) satisfies f ′ < 0, f ′′ ≥ 0, f(0) = 1, and f(1) = 0. Therefore,
given x, the proportion of informed consumers is 1− f(x) drawn uniformly from
[0, 1], where each consumer is equally likely to observe an advertisement. Both
firms take as given consumer behavior described above and play the subsequent
game with prices and advertising as strategic variables. Figure 1 summarizes the
setup thus far.
Figure 1: Consumer and Firm Interaction
Consumers enter the
market.
The low price firm
advertises leaving f(x)
consumers
uninformed.
Uninformed consumers
randomly visit one of
the two firms.
Informed consumers
visit the low price
firm.
Consumers offered the
low price buy the
good.
Consumers offered the
high price can choose
to search based on
their search costs.
Uninformed consumers
with sufficiently low
search costs who
randomly selected the
high cost firm pay the
extra cost to visit the
low price firm. High
search cost buyers buy
from the high price
firm.
The remaining
consumers at the low
cost firm buy at the
low price.
Although we formally address this issue in Section 2.2, assume for now that
each firm prices according to cost so that the low cost firm is the low price firm.
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In this case, the low and high price firms face the following demands:
qL = d(pL)
[
1−
1
2
f(x)(1−Q(sˆ))
]
; (2.2)
qH =
1
2
d(pH)f(x)(1−Q(sˆ)). (2.3)
In words, (2.3) comes from some proportion—determined by x—of consumers
being informed of the low price via advertising, leaving f(x) uninformed. Of
these, half randomly select the high cost firm, and some portion Q(sˆ) are active
searchers with sufficiently low search costs so that they never pay the high price.
Equation (2.3) is therefore the probability that any given buyer purchases from the
high price firm, where each buyer demands d(pH) units. The remaining consumers
pay the low price and demand d(pL) units each, which yields (2.2).
2.2 Existence, Stability, and Comparative Statics
We assume the monopolist’s problem
max
p∈[0,pmax)
Π = d(p)(p− c)
has a unique solution, denoted p∗, where Πp > 0 on [0, p
∗). Consumers receive
sufficient indirect utility so that they always purchase at the monopoly price
(v(p∗) + y ≥ p∗). We also assume
Πpp > −dpΠ, (2.4)
which essentially restricts the elasticity of demand. For notational convenience,
denote the monopolist’s first order condition evaluated at the high cost firm’s
price and cost by ΠHp and similarly for the low cost firm.
In this paper, we want to focus on the natural equilibrium where the low cost
firm is the low price firm. We therefore begin with an artificially restricted case
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where the low cost firm must price below the high cost firm. As such, only the
low cost firm advertises and faces the profit maximization problem
max
pL≤pH
x≤1
pLqL − Ax, (2.5)
which yields the following first order conditions for price and advertising, respec-
tively:
∂piL
∂pL
=
[
1−
1
2
f(x)(1−Q(sˆ))
]
ΠLp −
1
2
q(sˆ)f(x)d(pL)
2pL = 0; (2.6)
∂piL
∂x
= −
1
2
f ′(x)(1−Q(sˆ))d(pL)pL −A = 0. (2.7)
Similarly, we restrict the high cost firm to price above the low cost firm. The high
cost firm therefore does not advertise and must solve
max
c≤pH
pL≤pH<pmax
qH (pH − c) , (2.8)
which yields
∂piH
∂pH
=
1
2
f(x)(1−Q(sˆ))ΠHp −
1
2
f(x)q(sˆ)d(pH)
2(pH − c) = 0. (2.9)
Definition 1 In a restricted game, the low and high cost firms solve (2.5) and
(2.8), respectively. We define a restricted Nash equilibrium by the triplet
(p∗L, p
∗
H , x
∗) such that (p∗L, p
∗
H , x
∗) is a Nash equilibrium of this restricted game.
Having defined a restricted Nash equilibrium, we now show that such an equi-
librium exists. We then find conditions such that restricted Nash equilibria and
conventional Nash equilibria coincide.
Proposition 1 The profit functions, piL and piH , are quasi-concave in firms’ own
actions, strictly concave in pL and pH (for a given x), and a restricted pure-
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strategy Nash equilibrium exists provided the hazard function satisfies
q′(sˆ)
q(sˆ)
∈
(
−
ΠHp
ΠHd
,
ΠLp
ΠLd
)
. (2.10)
Condition (2.10) is a standard hazard condition that imposes restrictions on the
tails of the density. Certainly, the uniform distribution fits this requirement, but
in general, any standard hill or bell-shaped density with q′(s) relatively flat in the
tails will suffice.
Given existence of a restricted Nash equilibrium, we now provide conditions
such that the previous pricing restrictions are non-binding and the restricted Nash
equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in the conventional sense.
Proposition 2
(i) For all c > 0, every restricted Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium.
(ii) There exists some c¯ > 0 such that, for all c > c¯, every Nash equilibrium
involves the low cost firm pricing below the high cost firm.
Part (i) simply says that both firms are content with pricing at p∗L ≤ p
∗
H , while
part (ii) ensures that, even if allowed to choose any price up to pmax, firms still
choose prices consistent with the restrictions of equations (2.5) and (2.8).
We therefore have a duopoly game with heterogeneous consumers and firms in
which the low cost firm prices below the high cost firm and can advertise to some
fraction of consumers, where uninformed buyers can search for the lowest available
price. A price dispersed equilibrium exists and consumers follow an optimal search
rule, based on (2.1), so that both advertising and search effectively disseminate
information between buyers and firms.
We now impose stability via a standard proportional marginal profitability
adjustment rule.3
3See equation (C.1) in Appendix C.
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Proposition 3 Given the hazard condition (2.10) and c such that Q(c) < 1, the
conditions
f ′(x)
f(x)
> −
(1−Q(c))
(2pmax − c)2qmax
, and
f ′′(x)
f ′(x)
< −
3qmax
1−Q(c)
,
are sufficient such that the triplet (p∗L, p
∗
H , x
∗), where p∗L, p
∗
H ∈ [0, pmax) and x
∗ ∈
[0, 1], is a locally stable Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 3 formalizes the role of the advertising function in determining stabil-
ity, where we see that f ′(x) must be small relative to f(x) and f ′′(x) large relative
to f ′(x), in absolute value. Intuitively, this is a standard contraction condition
to ensure the effect of any given strategic variable on the marginal profitability of
that variable exceeds the effect on the marginal profitability of all other variables.
Using these stability conditions, we can now discuss comparative statics.
Proposition 4 Given stability and condition (2.10), the following relationships
hold in equilibrium:
(i) pL is increasing in c and decreasing in A;
(ii) pH is increasing in c and decreasing in A;
(iii) x is decreasing in A and is non-monotonic in c, where there exists some c∗
such that x is increasing in c for all c < c∗ and decreasing in c for all c > c∗;
(iv) price dispersion pH − pL is increasing in both c and A; and
(v) an exogenous increase in x increases both pH and pL and decreases price
dispersion.
These results are fairly intuitive. Consider first the response to an increase in the
cost of production, c. Naturally, the high cost firm must increase price. The low
cost firm, now with more residual demand, also responds with a price increase
but to a lesser degree. Therefore, pH , pL, as well as pH − pL are all increasing in
c.
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With regard to advertising, low c implies low price dispersion, in which case
many consumers are inactive searchers. Since there is only a small scope for price
adjustments, the low cost firm advertises more as c increases. Conversely, a high
cost of production implies high price dispersion so that price adjustments now play
a larger role. Advertising is also less likely to reach an inactive searcher relative
to when c is low. In this case, the low cost firm advertises less as c increases and
relies more on price competition.
Now consider the response to an increase in the cost of advertising, A. The low
price firm must decrease advertising intensity but also decreases pL to maintain
profits.4 To avoid losing a large share of the market, the high cost firm also
decreases price, but not by as much. Therefore pH and pL are both decreasing in
A, while pH − pL is increasing.
Condition (v) addresses the firms’ responses in price to exogenous changes in
advertising, i.e., the advertising decision of the planner. From the low cost firm’s
perspective, this essentially increases his residual demand at no cost. Similar to
an increase in c, the low cost firm responds by increasing pL. The high price
firm adopts a similar strategy but to a lesser degree, which implies that pH −
pL is decreasing in x. This decrease in price dispersion subsequently decreases
the proportion of consumers who engage in search. As we will see in Section
3, this tradeoff between advertising and search intensity has important welfare
implications.
3 Welfare and Advertising Intensity
We now have a model in which advertising plays a purely informational role in
announcing the true price and location of the low cost firm and thus implicitly
doing so for the high cost firm. But as mentioned in Section 1, welfare effects are
4It can be shown that, without stability, counter-intuitive comparative statics might result
in which advertising intensity increases with the cost of advertising. See Chapter 4 of Vives
(1999) for a thorough explanation.
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unclear due to the inherent tension between the social planner and the advertising
firm. To fully characterize when and how this tension might lead the firm to over-
or under-advertise, we consider the basic pricing/advertising game proposed in
Section 2 and study the firm’s advertising level relative to the level chosen by a
social planner. For simplification, we assume all consumers inelastically demand
one unit up to some maximum price, which fixes consumer surplus and total
revenue as a sum so that welfare depends totally on the transaction prices of
advertising, production, and search costs.
Denote the welfare attributed to the low and high cost firms by
wL = u¯
[
1−
1
2
f(x)(1−Q(sˆ))
]
−
1
2
f(x)
∫ sˆ
0
sq(s)ds− Ax, and (3.1)
wH =
1
2
(u¯− c) f(x) (1−Q(sˆ)) , (3.2)
respectively. In words, (3.1) comes from
[
1− 1
2
f(x)(1−Q(sˆ))
]
consumers receiv-
ing utility u¯ from purchasing the good, which the firm produces at zero cost.
Further, 1
2
f(x)
∫ sˆ
0
sq(s)ds represents those buyers who did not randomly select
the low cost firm and who were not informed through advertising but who have
sufficiently low search costs so that they pay to visit the other firm. This is a
welfare loss as it is the accumulated cost paid by all consumers who search to
reach the low price firm. The remaining term, Ax, is the cost of advertising,
which decreases welfare by lessening producer surplus. Equation (3.2) is similar
and differs due to no advertising, no extra search costs, and positive marginal
costs of production.
From equations (3.1) and (3.2), we see that the planner advertises essentially
for two reasons: one, so that consumers reach the low cost firm on their first
attempt and do not pay additional search costs, and two, to save the cost of
production incurred by the high cost firm. We also see that the planner has no
interest in the specific profit level of either firm. The low cost firm, however, cares
only about profit and is indifferent to whatever search costs its customers accrue.
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We can now formally discuss the planner’s problem and study existence. First
note that, from Proposition 1, piL and piH are strictly concave in pL and pH , respec-
tively. Therefore the first order conditions for price are necessary and sufficient
for the constrained planner’s problem. Assuming an interior solution, the social
planner solves
max
x∈[0,1]
u¯− Ax−
1
2
f(x)
∫ sˆ
0
sq(s)ds−
1
2
f(x)(1−Q(sˆ))c, (3.3)
subject to
∂piL
∂pL
=
[
1−
1
2
f(x)(1−Q(sˆ))
]
−
1
2
f(x)q(sˆ)pL = 0 (3.4)
∂piH
∂pH
= −q(sˆ)(pH − c) + 1−Q(sˆ) = 0, (3.5)
where sˆ = pH − pL.
By imposing the duopoly first order conditions, we focus on a structural second
best where the planner chooses advertising at prices consistent with firm behav-
ior.5 We need to impose these first order conditions essentially because the low
cost firm makes his advertising and pricing decisions simultaneously and must
consider the strategic complementarities between the two. Allowing the plan-
ner to ignore this interaction therefore imposes one set of rules on the firm and
a different set of rules on the planner. To resolve this issue and provide a fair
comparison, we impose the price first order conditions on the planner’s problem.
To solve the planner’s problem, we solve the constraints implicitly for sˆ(x)
and substitute this into the planner’s objective function, equation (3.3). Before
we can explicitly compare the firm’s and planner’s advertising levels, however, we
need to establish the existence of a unique socially optimal x.
Proposition 5 Given stability and condition (2.10), there exists a unique x¯ ∈
5See Vives (1999) Chapter 6 for a similar approach with product differentiation.
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[0, 1] such that x¯ maximizes (3.3), subject to the firms’ first order conditions for
price, provided
q′′(sˆ)
q(sˆ)
≤
−2f ′′(x)
f ′(x)(2pmax − c)c
−
2
(pmax − c)c
. (3.6)
Equation (3.6) simply restricts q′′(sˆ) so that it is not “too” positive. This ensures
that the planner’s objective function, after substituting sˆ(x), is globally concave
if x.
Given uniqueness, we determine over- or under-advertising by imposing the
first order condition for advertising from the low price firm, equation (2.7), on
the planner’s first order condition. The resulting sign indicates whether firms
advertise excessively or vice versa. Specifically, denote the planner’s objective
function by W (x) and the low price firm’s first order condition for advertising by
g(x; pL, pH). Over-advertising therefore results for
dW (x)
dx
|g(x;·)=0 < 0 and vice versa
for under-advertising. We summarize conditions for each result in Proposition 6.
Proposition 6 Denote the mean search cost consumer by µ, then given stability
and conditions (2.10) and (3.6),
(i) there exists some c¯, A, and pmax such that the duopolistic advertising level
always exceeds the socially optimal level for all c ≥ c¯, all A ≤ A, or all
pmax ≤
2
qmax
− µ;
(ii) for the specific advertising function denoted f(t, x), where ft < 0 and fx(t, 0)
sufficiently large, there exists some t¯ such that the duopolistic advertising
level always exceeds the socially optimal level for all t ≥ t¯; and
(iii) there exists some cost combination (A¯, c) such that, for all A ≥ A¯ and c ≤ c,
the duopolistic advertising level is always below that of a planner, provided
1−Q(c)
q(c)
< c.
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The comparison between the firm’s and planner’s advertising levels depends
primarily on sˆ − c. Whenever this is a large negative number, the firm over-
advertises, and as it approaches zero, the firm under-advertises. The planner
cares about this difference because it represents an implicit cost associated with
advertising. For instance, we know from Proposition 4 that price dispersion de-
creases in response to an exogenous increase in advertising. This means that, if the
planner increases x, some marginal consumers near sˆ will go from active searchers
(where they always buy at the low price) to inactive searchers (where they might
pay the high price). This implicit advertising cost increases as c increases relative
to sˆ.
Part (i) therefore describes three cases. In two of the three (pmax or A suffi-
ciently low), sˆ is low both in absolute terms and relative to c. Here, the firm has
a large incentive to advertise because inactive searchers make up a larger portion
of the market, while the planner would rather advertise less because the implicit
cost of advertising is high. The social benefit due to decreased search is also small
because sˆ is low. In the third case (c sufficiently high), sˆ is only low relative to
c but may be high in absolute terms. This is the case in which, although the
firm may have only a small incentive to advertise, the implicit cost of sending
relatively low search cost consumers from the low price firm to the high price firm
is substantial.
To better understand how the third case might arise, consider sˆ such that
Q(sˆ) ≥ 1/2 and sˆ ≤ (1/2)c, and assume that the planner increases advertising by
some small amount. Here, active searchers constitute the majority of the market,
and the welfare loss associated with the cost of production is significantly larger
than the welfare loss associated with search. An extra advertisement therefore
most likely reaches an active searcher, which provides some welfare gain, but also
sends some marginal active searcher to the high price firm. Since c is sufficiently
high relative to sˆ, this advertising decision is most likely a net welfare loss, and
the planner would regret adopting such a strategy. Note that this does not depend
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on the actual size of sˆ, only the relative size. Another important feature is that
advertising has a uniform effect on the market while changes in price dispersion
have a direct effect on consumers near sˆ. If the planner could increase advertising
and pinpoint exactly where the extra advertising went, this tradeoff determined
by sˆ− c would not be an issue.
Similar intuition holds for under-advertising in part (iii). As A increases, both
sˆ and sˆ − c increase. The firm therefore has lesser incentive to advertise due to
high sˆ, and the implicit welfare cost determined by sˆ− c is less relevant. Further,
the potential welfare gain associated with decreased search costs is larger since
sˆ is high. Note that the requirement for 1−Q(c)
q(c)
< c is essentially a hazard rate
condition that places an upper bound on the high cost firm’s profit margin even
for high price dispersion.
We are also interested in how the overall shape of the advertising function
might affect welfare. Part (ii) formally describes an advertising function where,
for given amounts of advertising, only a small share of the market remains unin-
formed. The intuition here is similar to that of low A or low pmax in part (i)—as
the incentive to advertise increases, the firm takes takes excessive advantage.
Note that, for symmetric search cost distributions, the indifferent consumer
having a low search cost is equivalent to a market composed primarily of inactive
searchers. For such distributions, we conclude that firms over-advertise when
inactive searchers compose the majority of the market. This does not hold for
all distributions, however, as a highly skewed q(·) could imply a large proportion
of consumers search while the indifferent consumer’s search cost remains small.
This also does not hold in reverse as we have already seen that, even if sˆ is large
in absolute terms, it might still be small relative to c, in which case the firm still
over-advertises.
Also note that, since all functions are continuous, and since both under- or
over-advertising can result, there must be some combination of distributions, func-
tional form specifications, and cost parameters such that the interests of both the
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firm and the planner align. Although this is a knife-edge situation, it is interest-
ing in that the two firms, acting purely in self-interest, could reach the socially
optimal outcome.
4 Conclusion
The imperfect nature of price information in search models provides a natural
framework within which to study price advertising. Previous studies, however,
have not offered definitive welfare results under optimal consumer and firm behav-
ior. This is a nontrivial issue as the planner and firm have potentially conflicting
definitions of the value of advertising. In this paper, we put enough structure on
the market to explicitly compare optimal and market advertising levels. We do
so in an equilibrium search setting and analyze a structural second best where we
impose the firms’ price first order conditions on the planner’s problem. Our anal-
ysis explains well the relationship between the firm’s and the planner’s incentives
to advertise.
We find that firms might under- or over-advertise relative to a planner and
that the result depends on several factors—primarily the effectiveness and cost of
advertising and the cost of production. We find that firms place significantly more
weight on the informational role of advertising whenever the indifferent consumer’s
search cost is low and vice versa when this search cost is high relative to the cost
of production.
In particular, we get both under- and over-advertising in a setting where ad-
vertising is purely informative and without focusing on many identical firms. We
do so in the context of an equilibrium consumer search model where (i) adver-
tising has an obvious role in forming and improving buyers’ knowledge of prices
and (ii) where advertising and search are imperfect substitutes for transmitting
price information. Our results show that the welfare effects of advertising are not
a strict byproduct of the type of advertising in question, the elasticity of demand,
18
or the nature of competition among firms.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
By assumption, all functions are continuous and strategy sets are compact intervals. Therefore,
by the standard Nash-Debreu theorem, a restricted pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists so
long as profit functions are quasi-concave in own strategy variables. From (2.9),
∂2piH
∂p2H
=
1
2
f(x)(1 −Q(sˆ))ΠHpp −
1
2
f(x)d(pH)
[
q(sˆ)ΠHp + q
′(sˆ)d(pH)Π
H
]
−
1
2
f(x)q(sˆ)
[
d(pH)Π
H
p + d
′(pH)Π
H
]
. (A.1)
By previous assumptions on the monopolist’s problem, the hazard condition, and on the adver-
tising function, we know that (A.1) is negative so that piH is strictly concave. By these same
conditions,
∂2piL
∂pL∂x
= −
1
2
f ′(x)
[
(1−Q(sˆ))ΠLp + q(sˆ)d(pL)Π
L
]
> 0, (A.2)
∂2piL
∂x2
= −
1
2
f ′′(x)(1 −Q(sˆ))d(pL)pL ≤ 0, and (A.3)
∂2piL
∂p2L
=
[
1−
1
2
f(x)(1 −Q(sˆ))
]
ΠLpp
−
1
2
f(x)d(pL)
[
q(sˆ)ΠLp − q
′(sˆ)d(pL)Π
L
]
−
1
2
q(sˆ)f(x)
[
d(pL)Π
L
p + d
′(pL)Π
L
]
< 0. (A.4)
Therefore, the determinant of the bordered Hessian for the low cost firm must be positive, which
then implies that piL is quasi-concave. 
B Proof of Proposition 2
First Prove (i)
First note that, from Π = d(p)(p − c), we know that for any common price pH = pL = p,
ΠHp |pH=p = d
′(p)(p − c) + d(p) > d′(p)p + d(p) = ΠLp |pL=p for all c > 0. Now suppose there
exists a restricted Nash equilibrium that is not a Nash equilibrium. In such a case, at least
one player is not making a best response. Figure 2 represents a graphical example of such a
situation, where at least one firm would like to deviate from the restricted pricing strategy for
a given advertising intensity x.
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Figure 2: Profit Functions
pH pL
piH piL
pL pH
∂piH
∂pH
|pL=pH ≤ 0
∂piL
∂pL
|pH=pL ≥ 0
If the high cost firm is not making a best response, then ∂piH
∂pH
|pH=pL < 0, while if the low cost firm
is not making a best response, ∂piL
∂pL
|pL=pH > 0. In either case, it must be that
∂piH
∂pH
|pH=pL ≤ 0
and ∂piL
∂pL
|pL=pH ≥ 0, where it follows that the restricted equilibrium must be at pH = pL, which
implies that x∗ = 0, f(x∗) = 1, and Q(sˆ) = Q(0) = 0. The resulting first order conditions are
as follows (where pL = pH = p):
∂piH
∂pH
=
1
2
ΠHp |pH=p −
1
2
q(0)d(p)2(p− c), and
∂piL
∂pL
=
1
2
ΠLp |pL=p −
1
2
q(0)d(p)2p.
Since ΠHp > Π
L
p from before, we see that
∂piH
∂pH
>
∂piL
∂pL
must hold for all c > 0. Without loss of generality, assume ∂piH
∂pH
≤ 0. Then it must be that
∂piL
∂pL
<
∂piH
∂pH
≤ 0.
This cannot be a restricted equilibrium as ∂piL
∂pL
< 0, and the low cost firm wants to decrease
price.
Now Prove (ii)
From (i), we know that p∗H = p
∗
L cannot hold in equilibrium, so we need only consider the case
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where p∗H < p
∗
L. Denote each firm’s monopoly price by pM (c) = max(p− c)d(p), so that pM (0)
is the monopoly price of the low cost firm. In any Nash equilibrium, p∗L < pM (0) < pmax. Then
for pmax > c > pM (0), the high cost firm never prices below pL. Accordingly, there exists some
c¯ > 0, c¯ < pmax, such that, for all c > c¯, every Nash equilibrium involves the low cost firm
pricing below the high cost firm. 
C Proof of Proposition 3
Assume that firms adjust their strategies according to
dai
dt
= ki
∂pii(a1, a2, a3)
∂ai
(C.1)
in a neighborhood of the equilibrium. In the usual way, we take a first-order Taylor approxima-
tion and, ignoring the constants ki, we find

 dpLdtdpH
dt
dx
dt

 =


∂2piL(p
∗
L
,p∗
H
,x∗)
∂p2
L
∂2piL(p
∗
L
,p∗
H
,x∗)
∂pL∂pH
∂2piL(p
∗
L
,p∗
H
,x∗)
∂pL∂x
∂2piH(p
∗
L
,p∗
H
,x∗)
∂pH∂pL
∂2piH(p
∗
L
,p∗
H
,x∗)
∂p2
H
∂2piH(p
∗
L
,p∗
H
,x∗)
∂pH∂x
∂2piL(p
∗
L
,p∗
H
,x∗)
∂x∂pL
∂2piL(p
∗
L
,p∗
H
,x∗)
∂x∂pH
∂2piL(p
∗
L
,p∗
H
,x∗)
∂x2



 pL − p∗LpH − p∗H
x− x∗

 .
We need to show that the real parts of all eigenvalues are negative, which will ensure that
our system is stable. A sufficient condition, therefore, is that our Hessian matrix has a dominant
diagonal. By definition, any n×n matrix A has a dominant diagonal if there exists some di > 0,
for i = 1, 2, ..., n, such that di|piii| >
∑
j 6=i dj |piij |.
For convenience, denote the following
λ11 = (A.4),
λ12 =
1
2
f(x)d(pH)
[
q(sˆ)ΠLp − q
′(sˆ)d(pL)Π
L
]
,
λ13 = (A.2),
λ21 =
1
2
f(x)d(pL)
[
q(sˆ)ΠHp + q
′(sˆ)d(pH)Π
H
]
,
λ22 = (A.1),
λ23 =
1
2
f ′(x)
[
(1−Q(sˆ))ΠHp − q(sˆ)d(pH)Π
H
]
,
λ31 = (A.2),
λ32 =
1
2
f ′(x)q(sˆ)d(pH)Π
H , and
λ33 = (A.3).
Denote the matrix with the above elements by Λ. Sufficient conditions under elastic demand
are complicated and omitted for space. It can be shown, however, that such conditions are
maximized under inelastic demand. Accordingly, we consider unit inelastic demand to show
that Λ has a dominant diagonal. After imposing the first order conditions for price and setting
d1 = d2 = d3 = 1, the following three conditions are sufficient for a dominant diagonal and thus
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stability:
−
1
2
f(x)q(sˆ)−
f ′(x)
f(x)
< 0,
−
1
2
f(x)q(sˆ) < 0, and
−
1
2
f ′′(x)(1 −Q(sˆ))pL −
f ′(x)
f(x)
−
1
2
f ′(x)q(sˆ)pL < 0.
These hold so long as
f ′(x)
f(x)
> −
1
2
f(x)q(sˆ), and (C.2)
f ′′(x)
f ′(x)
< −
1
1−Q(sˆ)
[
2
pLf(x)
+ q(sˆ)
]
. (C.3)
Using equilibrium conditions
pL =
2
f(x)q(sˆ)
−
1−Q(sˆ)
q(sˆ)
, and
pH − c =
1−Q(sˆ)
q(sˆ)
,
we see that sˆ = 2
q(sˆ)
[
1−Q(sˆ)− 1
f(x)
]
+ c, which implies that sˆ is bounded above by c. We also
see that f(x) is bounded below by 2(2pmax−c)qmax and that q(sˆ) is bounded below by
1−Q(sˆ)
pmax−c
.
Therefore, assuming Q(c) < 1 provides an upper bound of Q(sˆ) and a lower bound on 1−Q(sˆ),
and we can rewrite the above conditions as
f ′(x)
f(x)
> −
(1−Q(c))
(2pmax − c)(pmax − c)qmax
, and (C.4)
f ′′(x)
f ′(x)
< −
3qmax
1−Q(c)
. (C.5)
Therefore, under conditions (C.4) and (C.5), Λ has a dominant diagonal, and the adjustment
process defined by (C.1) is locally stable. Note that the expression for (C.4) given in the text is
a slightly stronger sufficient condition. 
D Proof of Proposition 4
Totally differentiating the system of first order conditions formed by (2.6), (2.9), and (2.7) with
respect to pL, pH , x, A, and c provides the system of equations with which to derive comparative
statics. Recalling Λ above, the differentiated system can then be written as follows:
Λ

 dpLdpH
dx

 =

 0− 12f(x)q(sˆ)d(pH)2dc
dA

 .
Just as in Appendix C, we impose the first order conditions for price, which greatly simplifies
λ23 and λ13. We also again consider the inelastic demand case for brevity, where it can be shown
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that the determinant is maximized under this setting. This yields
|Λ| = −
1
8
f ′′(x)f(x)2(1−Q(sˆ))pL (2q(sˆ)− q
′(sˆ)pL) (2q(sˆ) + q
′(sˆ)(pH − c))
+
1
8
f ′′(x)f(x)2(1−Q(sˆ))pL (q(sˆ) + q
′(sˆ)(pH − c)) (q(sˆ)− q
′(sˆ)pL)
−
f ′(x)2
2f(x)
[f(x)q(sˆ)pL (q(sˆ) + q
′(sˆ)(pH − c))− (2q(sˆ) + q
′(sˆ)(pH − c))] .
Imposing stability conditions (C.2) and (C.3), it follows that |Λ| < 0, and applying Cramer’s
rule, we find
dpL
dc
=
1
2f(x)q(sˆ)
[
− 14f(x)f
′′(x)(1 −Q(sˆ))pL[q(sˆ)− q
′(sˆ)pL] +
f ′(x)2
2f(x) q(sˆ)pL
]
|Λ|
≥ 0,
dpL
dA
= −
1
2f
′(x) [2q(sˆ) + q′(sˆ)(pH − c)]
|Λ|
≤ 0,
dpH
dc
= −
1
2f(x)q(sˆ)
[
1
4f
′′(x)f(x)(1 −Q(sˆ))pL[2q(sˆ)− q
′(sˆ)pL]−
f ′(x)2
f(x)2
]
|Λ|
≥ 0,
dpH
dA
= −
1
2f
′(x)[q(sˆ) + q′(sˆ)(pH − c)]
|Λ|
≤ 0,
dx
dc
=
1
4f
′(x)f(x)q(sˆ)
[
− 12f(x)q(sˆ)pL[2q(sˆ)− q
′(sˆ)pL] + (q(sˆ)− q
′(sˆ)pL)
]
|Λ|
<
=
>
0,
dx
dA
=
1
4f(x)
2 [(2q(sˆ)− q′(sˆ)pL)(2q(sˆ) + q
′(sˆ)(pH − c))]
|Λ|
−
1
4f(x)
2 [(q(sˆ)− q′(sˆ)pL)(q(sˆ) + q
′(sˆ)(pH − c))]
|Λ|
≤ 0.
With respect to advertising, we treat x as exogenous and derive dsˆdx in the usual way. Again
looking at the inelastic demand case, totally differentiating (2.6) and (2.9) with respect to pH ,
pL, x, and c yields the following system[
−q′(sˆ)(pH − c)− 2q(sˆ) q
′(sˆ)(pH − c) + q(sˆ)
1
2f(x) (q(sˆ)− q
′(sˆ)pL) −
1
2f(x) (2q(sˆ)− q
′(sˆ)pL)
] [
dpH
dpL
]
=[
−q(sˆ)dc
1
2f
′(x) (1−Q(sˆ) + q(sˆ)pL) dx
]
.
For simplicity, define the following matrices:
Ω =
[
−q′(sˆ)(pH − c)− 2q(sˆ) q
′(sˆ)(pH − c) + q(sˆ)
1
2f(x) (q(sˆ)− q
′(sˆ)pL) −
1
2f(x) (2q(sˆ)− q
′(sˆ)pL)
]
,
ΩpH =
[
−q(sˆ)dc q′(sˆ)(pH − c) + q(sˆ)
1
2f
′(x) (1−Q(sˆ) + q′(sˆ)pL) dx −
1
2f(x) (2q(sˆ)− q
′(sˆ)pL)
]
, and
ΩpL =
[
−q′(sˆ)(pH − c)− 2q(sˆ) −q(sˆ)dc
1
2f(x) (q(sˆ)− q
′(sˆ)pL)
1
2f
′(x) (1−Q(sˆ) + q′(sˆ)pL) dx
]
.
From conditions (2.10) and (A.1), we know that
|Ω| =
1
2
f(x)q(sˆ) [q′(sˆ)(pH − pL − c) + 3q(sˆ)] > 0.
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Looking only at pH , we see that
dpH =
[2q(sˆ)− q′(sˆ)pL] dc
q′(sˆ)(pH − pL − c) + 3q(sˆ)
−
f ′(x) [1−Q(sˆ) + q(sˆ)pL] [q
′(sˆ)(pH − c) + q(sˆ)] dx
f(x)q(sˆ) [q′(sˆ)(pH − pL − c) + 3q(sˆ)]
.
Setting dc to zero, we find
dpH
dx
=
−f ′(x) [1−Q(sˆ) + q(sˆ)pL] [q
′(sˆ)(pH − c) + q(sˆ)]
f(x)q(sˆ) [q′(sˆ)(pH − pL − c) + 3q(sˆ)]
.
The same process for pL yields
dpL
dx
=
−f ′(x) [1−Q(sˆ) + q(sˆ)pL] [q
′(sˆ)(pH − c) + 2q(sˆ)]
f(x)q(sˆ) [q′(sˆ)(pH − pL − c) + 3q(sˆ)]
.
Therefore, we know
dsˆ
dx
=
dpH
dx
−
dpL
dx
=
f ′(x) [1−Q(sˆ) + q(sˆ)pL]
f(x) [q′(sˆ)(pH − pL − c) + 3q(sˆ)]
< 0. 
E Proof of Proposition 5
Since piL and piH are concave in pL and pH respectively, the first order conditions for pL and pH
are necessary and sufficient for a constrained optimum of the planner’s problem. We can then
solve the constraints implicitly for sˆ(x) and plug this into the objective function. To ensure a
unique optimum, we need only show that the resulting function is strictly concave.
Differentiating the welfare function and rearranging terms yields
d2W
dx2
= −
1
2
f ′′(x)
[
(1 −Q(sˆ))c+
∫ sˆ
0
sq(s)ds
]
− f ′(x)q(sˆ)(sˆ− c)
dsˆ
dx
−
1
2
f(x)q(sˆ)
(
dsˆ
dx
)2
−
1
2
f(x)(sˆ − c)
[
q′(sˆ)
(
dsˆ
dx
)2
+ q(sˆ)
d2sˆ
dx2
]
. (E.1)
After substituting dsˆdx and
d2 sˆ
dx2 and some tedious algebra, we see that (E.1) is always negative pro-
vided q
′′(sˆ)
q(sˆ) ≤
−f ′′(x)
f ′(x)(2pmax−c)c
− 2(pmax−c)c , and there exists a unique socially optimal advertising
level subject to the equilibrium duopoly price level. 
F Proof of Proposition 6
First Prove (i)
For convenience, denote φ =
∫ sˆ
0
sq(s)ds + (1 −Q(sˆ))(c − pL), then substituting the firm’s first
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order condition for advertising, (2.7), yields
dW
dx
|xd = −
1
2
f ′(x)φ −
1
2
f(x)q(sˆ)(sˆ− c)
dsˆ
dx
= −
1
2
f ′(x)φ −
1
2
f ′(x)q(sˆ)(sˆ− c)
1−Q(sˆ) + q(sˆ)pL
q′(sˆ)(pH − pL − c) + 3q(sˆ)
= −
1
2
f ′(x)φ − q(sˆ)
f ′(x)(sˆ − c)
f(x) [q′(sˆ)(pH − pL − c) + 3q(sˆ)]
where the third equality comes from substituting (2.6). From this equation, we know the sign
of dWdx |xd depends on φ. To see this, note that equilibrium first order conditions, (2.6) and (2.9),
require
sˆ− c = pH − pL − c =
2
q(sˆ)
[
1−Q(sˆ)− f−1(x)
]
which is nonpositive as f(x) ∈ [0, 1] and Q(sˆ) ≥ 0. Also, from (2.10) we know q′(sˆ)(pH − pL −
c) + 3q(sˆ) > 0. So the following results hold:
dW
dx
|xd > 0 iff φ >
−2q(sˆ)(sˆ− c)
f(x) [q′(sˆ)(sˆ− c) + 3q(sˆ)]
; (F.1)
dW
dx
|xd < 0 iff φ <
−2q(sˆ)(sˆ− c)
f(x) [q′(sˆ)(sˆ− c) + 3q(sˆ)]
. (F.2)
First consider the upper bound of φ. From equations (2.6) and (2.9), we see that c − pL =
pH −
2
q(sˆ)f(x) , which is bounded above by pmax −
2
qmax
. This implies that φ is bounded above
by µ + pmax −
2
qmax
, where µ is the mean of s (note that µ ≥
∫ sˆ
0 sq(s)ds). Therefore, for
pmax <
2
qmax
− µ, it follows that dWdx |xd < 0.
We proceed by examining the comparative statics of sˆ to changes in c and A as well the
upper bound of φ to determine when equation (F.2) holds. First, we rewrite the upper bound
of φ by noting that
∫ sˆ
0
sq(s)ds ≤ sˆQ(sˆ), which implies that φ ≤ c + Q(sˆ)(sˆ − c). Therefore,
over-advertising results for
c+Q(sˆ)(sˆ− c) ≤ −
2(sˆ− c)
f(x)
[
q′(sˆ)
q(sˆ) (sˆ− c) + 3
] . (F.3)
We use both equations (F.2) and (F.3) in the following. Note that any equilibrium requires
sˆ ≤ 1. Otherwise, the low price firm could increase price to pH − 1 and still get the entire
market. Since sˆ− c is always negative in equilibrium, this implies that min{1, c} ≥ sˆ ≥ 0. Now
consider the left and right hand sides of equation (F.2) as sˆ goes to its maximum, where we
see that the left hand side is bounded above by c for c ≤ 1 and bounded above by µ for c > 1,
and the right hand side is equal to 0 for c ≤ 1 and is positive for c > 1. For the lower bound
of sˆ (sˆ = 0), we see that φ = c − pH < 0 as sˆ = 0 ⇒ pL = pH . Since the right hand side is
positive for sˆ = 0, it follows that equation (F.2) is always satisfied for sˆ = 0 and unsatisfied for
sˆ = c ≤ 1. Figure 3 describes these bounds graphically, where over-advertising is depicted by
the range in which RHS is above LHS. We only consider graphically the case where c ≤ 1, but
a similar result holds for c > 1 as φ remains bounded above by µ.
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Figure 3: Over-advertising
sˆ
LHS,
RHS
c
c
c−pH
0
LHS
RHS
While the functions on the left and right hand sides both change as sˆ and c change, the
bounds remain fixed as in figure 3. Since all functions are continuous, it follows that there
exists some sˆ such that over-advertising results for all sˆ ≤ sˆ. From Proposition 4, we see that
sˆ is increasing in A. Therefore, there exists some A such that, for all A ≤ A, the duopolistic
advertising level exceeds the social optimum.
Finally, recall that sˆ→ 1 as c increases, in which case φ =
∫ sˆ
0
sq(s)ds+(1−Q(sˆ))(c−pL)→ µ
since Q(1) = 1. Now, the right hand side of equation (F.2) is increasing in c while the left hand
side does not change, so there exists some c¯ such that over-advertising results for all c ≥ c¯.6
This proves part (i).
Now Prove (ii)
Since the upper bound for φ is independent of x, and since the lower bound for
−2q(sˆ)(sˆ− c)
f(x) [q′(sˆ)(sˆ− c) + 3q(sˆ)]
is increasing in x, it follows that over-advertising results for f(x) ∈ [0, 1] sufficiently small. We
formally characterize this by considering f(t, x), t > 0, in which case ft < 0 and t sufficiently
large implies that f(x) is small even for small levels of advertising. Finally, we restrict problems
along the boundary by assuming that, as x→ 0, fx becomes large. This proves part (ii).
Now Prove (iii)
Recall that over-advertising occurs iff φ > −2q(sˆ)(sˆ−c)
f(x)[q′(sˆ)(sˆ−c)+3q(sˆ)] . Following a similar process as
with part (i), sˆ → c as A increases, which implies that pH − c = pL. This also implies that
(1−Q(sˆ))(c− pL)→ (1−Q(c))(c− (pH − c)).
Now consider (1 − Q(c))(2c − pH) as a lower bound for φ at sˆ = c. To ensure that this
is positive, we need 1−Q(c)
q(c) < c, in which case φ is positive at this lower bound and the right
6We consider the more extreme argument of sˆ → 1 so as to avoid the extra assumptions dealing with how
the right hand side of equation (F.2) shifts relative the left hand side as c increases, although it can be show that
under assumptions consistent with existence of a social optimum and stability, such a result holds.
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hand side goes to zero. Therefore, provided c is relatively small so that sˆ is bounded below 1,
equation (F.1) will hold for some A sufficiently large since sˆ is increasing in A. So, there exists
some cost pair (A¯, c) such that for all A ≥ A¯ and c ≤ c the duopolistic advertising level is below
that of a planner. This proves part (iii). 
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